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Roundtable: Opportunities for and
Limitations of Private Ordering in Family
Law

INTRODUCTION
JEFFREY EVANS STAKE' & MICHAEL GROSSBERG2

The Roundtable was constructed in an effort to contribute to the growing
debate about private ordering in family law. Each member of the Roundtable was
asked to take some position on the basic question of whether private ordering
should be the dominant new force in family lav. As the centerpiece of the
Symposium, the Roundtable was intended to provide the audience with some
overview of the topic, some of the broader connections going beyond the
particulars to the larger issues and context, and to get a variety of perspectives
on the significance, legitimacy, and efficacy of private ordering in family law.
It is obvious that a wide variety of laws-from rules governing marriage,
divorce, and child custody through contract, professional responsibility, and
wills-influence family structure and the behavior of family members. Family
law is a site for highly visible and important contests between state regulation
and individual or family autonomy. It appears to a new student of family law that
one fundamental question cutting across many issues is how much freedom to
allow individuals in choosing the legally enforced rules by which they as
members of families will play and, on the other side, to what extent legal
decisionmakers such as judges and legislators ought to define the rules. Should
we adopt as a basic principle that it is good to avoid legal constraints on
decisionmaking, leaving maximal freedom in structuring arrangements to
institutions such as families, churches, and voluntary social and business groups?
Or would it be better to start from the assumption that seems to have prevailed
for centuries that it is up to society to define through the law a marriage, a
divorce, or a will?
Clearly, there must be some socially imposed definition; if each person can
define "marriage" or "will" to mean whatever he or she wishes, the words lose
all meaning. So the question is one of degree. But there are huge differences in
degree, leaving plenty of room for disagreement. When is private judgment
inferior to social judgment on how relationships should develop and operate?
And when should social judgment, if one is to be imposed, be exercised through
the law rather than being left to other institutions? In particular, what criteria
ought we to apply in deciding when an issue is for private decisionmaking and
when one is for public control?
It sometimes looks like the law has shifted away from societally fixed rules
toward more flexibility. But changes in family law over the past few decades.
have been somewhat contradictory and ambiguous in their embrace of private

1. Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
.2.Professor, Department of History, Indiana University-Bloomington.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 73:535

ordering. Private authority has decreased in areas such as child abuse, but has
increased in others, such as the consequences of divorce. What is the trend, if
any, and will it continue? What has it cost us so far and should it continue?
The debate over private ordering in family law raises fundamental questions
about the power of the state and of individuals. Consequently, it has produced
a variety of opinions, proposals, and conflicts. Political divisions of opinion on
this issue can be interesting. Those objecting to constitutional protections of
privacy seem to want to promote private ordering. Are these positions consistent?
Those wanting more privacy to be protected by the Constitution sometimes want
less private ordering. Can privacy and private ordering be on opposite sides?
Each of the presenters below had an opportunity to speak to these issues before
the discussion was opened to the audience. The remarks were recorded,
transcribed, and edited for publication here.
JEFFREY EVANS STAKE

I was once asked whether I believed in private ordering in the family law
context. The question reminded me of the man who was asked whether he
believed in baptism. His answer was "Believe in it? Hell! I've seen it done!" I
too have seen it done, private ordering that is. We should keep in mind that most
ordering is private. The question then is how much the law ought to lend a
helping hand in private ordering, how much the law should enforce private
arrangements of rights and obligations.
I think that we as a society have not taken full advantage of existing
opportunities to assist in private ordering. There exist today areas of law in
which people could benefit from being allowed to make decisions for themselves,
but the state has not permitted or helped them to do so. The paper presented by
Professor Eric Rasmusen earlier today provides one example I offer another
example, an example which expands this family-law discussion to include what
Professor Greg Alexander calls "family property" in his casebook on the subject
of wills and trusts.
Suppose Dobie tells his lawyer to draw up a will giving everything to Thalia.
His lawyer does so, and sends a draft to Dobie. After reading and approving the
draft, Dobie signs it, and puts it in his lock box. He tells his relatives and friends,
including the reliable witness Maynard, he is leaving everything to Thalia. Dobie
then dies. When Maynard offers the will for probate, Dobie's brother Davey, his
closest living relative, stands up and says, "Wait a minute. The will is no good.
I get everything." He contests probate on the ground that no witnesses attested
the will. The courts in most states will agree, refusing to admit unattested
writings.
Scholarly reformers have argued, however, that this will should be admitted.
Their position has been codified in a new provision of the Uniform Probate
Code. Section 2-503 orders courts to relax the formalities if it is clear that Dobie
intended the document to be his will.

3. See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil ofIgnorance:Personalizing
the MarriageContract,73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998).
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There is no doubt that some decedents will benefit from 2-503. Their intent
will be followed where it would not have been followed under the traditional
Wills Acts because of a failure to follow some formality. The benefits of 2-503
accrue to the decedent.
Some of the costs of 2-503 also fall on the decedent. Section 2-503 will create
an opportunity for chicanery. By eliminating the witness requirement, 2-503 will
create opportunities for overbearing friends and relatives to exert undue
influence and openings for swindlers to trick the unwary, deceiving them into
signing documents they do not want to be their wills. In such cases, the intent of
the decedent will not be followed. Likewise if the decedent made an impulsive
will, without the sobering effect of the formalities. Section 2-503 is not limited
to good documents. It improves the chances of admission of both kinds of
instrument, good and bad.
Another cost borne by the testator, Dobie, before death, is worry. The
dispensing power is not limited to cases involving first wills. It gives courts the
power to admit subsequent wills to probate, revoking the earlier ones. So 2-503
gives people who have written wills a new worry to cope with, the worry that a
bad document will revoke their good will and upset their testamentary scheme.
These bad documents could be the result of devious persons preying upon the
weak or the result of simple mistakes. And even if Dobie successfully resists
attempts to upset his testamentary plan, it may be unpleasant for him to deal with
those charlatans who try to manipulate him into giving them a portion of his
estate.
The sum of it is that 2-503 generates both costs and benefits for decedents. The
dispensing power might improve results for some people but it will not for
others. It is possible for a sensible person to feel less comfortable with 2-503 on
the books than without it. Indeed, though some (having heard this morning's
discussion) may doubt whether I am sensible, I would prefer, as a decedent-to-be,
that 2-503 not be adopted in Indiana.
Let us set aside the individual decedent for a moment and look at the rest of
society's interests. Here 2-503 generates a loss, more costs than benefits. First,
and most obvious, we can expect it to increase the number of cases disputed in
probate court. Section 2-503 encourages anyone with a letter mentioning a gift
to try to get that document probated. Litigation will be more frequent.
Second, 2-503 increases the cost of each case in two ways. The traditional
formalities encourage testators to generate good evidence while they can at a low
cost. The old formalities are like preventive maintenance, they encourage clarity
in order to avoid suits later. By contrast, the message of 2-503 is that you might
get your wish even if you do not leave good evidence behind. You need not
bother being careful. Moreover, 2-503 is a fuzzy rule calling for the exercise of
judgment rather than a relatively determinate, categorical rule requiring only
mechanical application. Section 2-503 increases the body of evidence presented
to a court, costing courts more time per case. Attempts to show by clear and
convincing evidence that some instrument was or was not intended to be a will
are more costly to resolve than disputes as to whether two witnesses signed
because more evidence is relevant to the former question.
Third, by making it easier, even if only slightly, for dishonest persons to grab
someone's assets, 2-503 encourages that behavior. In addition to the harm done
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to the decedents and the injustice to their intended beneficiaries, such behavior
is inefficient. Instead of spending time on something productive, some people
will waste time attempting to induce others to sign a document that makes a gift
contrary to their intents. Section 2-503 may increase such rent-seeking.
Where are the societal benefits that justify these societal costs? The UPC
reform proposal urges states, in effect, to pick up these costs of following the
decedent's intent more often. This is not, by itself, a surprising suggestion. As
society gets richer, we should expect increased willingness on its part to purchase
justice and other expensive goods (such as advanced medical procedures) that
cannot be justified when it is a little closer question whether many of us will
starve or freeze to death.
Before the state picks up this tab, however, we ought to make sure 2-503 buys
something testators want. I have already said it is not something I want. In my
case, society would incur increased litigation and other costs in order to make me
less happy. That is a waste.
I do not conclude, however, that 2-503 should be rejected. Scholars can debate
whether section 2-503 ought or ought not be adopted. I prefer an intermediate
position: let Dobie decide whether 2-503 applies to his documents. The UPC
position, allowing the court to dispense with formalities, could be the default
rule. But it ought not be a limiting rule. Section 2-503 should be amended to
allow Dobie to opt out. This could be accomplished by adding to the beginning
of 2-503, "Unless the decedent has clearly provided otherwise in a previous
will,".
Such an amendment would allow Dobie to save societal resources while
making himself happier. Moreover, the law would empower Dobie to make a
commitment to himself that he cannot easily undo. Only by enforcing his rules
against him can the law give Dobie the sense of security and peace of mind that
comes with the knowledge that he cannot, in a fit of peak, unravel all of the
careful plans he has made for Thalia.
Stepping back for perspective, what do these proposals, one relating to grounds
for divorce and the other to the dispensing power, have in common? In both,
individuals are empowered to create their own legal regimes. Both arguments rest
heavily on the notion that ordinary people can make sensible decisions for
themselves. Both assert that people, as Professor Alexander mentioned earlier,
can profitably bind themselves to the mast, as Ulysses did. And both contend that
the law, like Ulysses' crew, ought to assist people in protecting themselves from
the siren songs of today.
Is there a higher principle? Maybe not much higher. But there is a slightly
broader principle, perhaps, and it is this: if the law vacillates between two
regimes, individuals should be given their choice of the two. I call this the
"Vacillation Principle," although I remain open to suggestions on the name.
Anytime we recognize that two regimes exist or have recently existed, we should
immediately ask ourselves why all people should not be given a choice between
them. We should ask not which is better, but why either should be precluded. If
A is a reasonable rule and B is a reasonable rule and there is a continuum
between them, then let people choose.
The law once said divorce should be granted only for fault. The law now says
no fault need be shown. Reformers have lately proposed returning to the fault
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requirement. This vacillation should trigger the question: Why not let people
decide for themselves which is the better legal regime? The law in Indiana says
two witnesses are needed on a will. The law in Colorado says witnesses are not
needed if the intent is clear. I say, it is time to ask ourselves: "Why not let people
choose their own probate requirements?" When we see legal irresolution or
incertitude, when society wavers on a point of law, we ought not argue further
but ought rather to ask why the point is not within the domain of private choice.
There are some limitations on the application of this vacillation principle. First,
some rules of law are conventions for which universal adoption is critical. The
English drive on the left, Americans on the right; Sweden has tried both. It will
not do to let people choose their own rules of the road. Private ordering would
be ridiculous.
Second, choices can be limited to those that are reasonable. The laws of some
states and times are simply morally unacceptable. The law long ago said divorce
was illegal. Knowing what we know today about wife abuse, it would be immoral
to bind a woman to an abusive husband. The law need not let people choose
unreasonable legal regimes. Some past rules, like slavery, are no longer
acceptable.
Third, there is the usual question of externalities. We cannot expect all private
choices to be honored, no matter the cost to society. If there are unproxied
negative externalities to a proposed private regime, that regime need not be
enforced by the law. A state may rightly say, for example, that it does not wish
to pay the increased costs of litigation attending section 2-503.
The fourth limitation, and there may be plenty more, is that allowing private
choice may be unhelpful when there are signalling problems. For an example,
consider premarital agreements. The law enforces antenuptial contracts relating
to the division of property at divorce. People do not take advantage of this
private ordering opportunity, even though many people consider it a good idea.
Why not? Because there is a signalling problem. No one wants to start the
conversation, "By the way Honey, before we get married, we should decide what
will happen to our assets if we divorce." Honey might get the wrong idea. We
cannot be confident that merely providing the legal opportunity to negotiate will
lead to good results. The law might best deal with that situation by taking away
the couple's choice not to choose, forcing them to make a choice of divorce
regime.
To sum up: Legal scholars often argue over what set of rules would be best,
knowing that those rules will not fit all persons equally well, or well at all. We
ought to ask, more often than we do, whether it is essential for all people to live
under a single legal regime. I predict that on close look, we will see that a single
regime by which all must abide is often unnecessary. On that closer look we will
see that we can achieve a better fit with individual aspirations by allowing
individuals to choose their legal regime. What I have called the vacillation
principle can help us find those opportunities for replacing one-size-fits-all laws
with individually tailored regimes.
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In The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other .Twentieth-Century
Tragedies,5 I argued for abolishing marriage as a legal category, and with it the
whole set of special rules that we call "family law." By "family law," I refer not
only to those rules that govern divorce and custody, but also to areas of
regulation where family is a consequential category, such as inheritance and tax
law. My call was for abolition of marriage as a legal concept. People could still
choose to celebrate sexual unions as a religious or cultural event, but it would
have no special legal significance.
Was this call for abolishing marriage also a call for private ordering and a
retreat from the prospect of state regulation? In a way, it was. Private ordering
would be the result as sexual affiliates (formerly known as husbands and wives)
resorted to private law, contract, for example, to order the consequences of their
relationship. But state regulation of the conduct of their relationship might
actually increase. This is the case because it would not only be contract law that
filled the void left by the withdrawal of family-law doctrine. We would also
apply the rules that govern the relationships among strangers-torts and criminal
law, for example-to interactions between sexual affiliates. In other words,
marital privacy would be abolished along with marriage and sexually intimate
relationships would no longer be shielded from public concern.
Feminists have made an effective case that marriage has hidden a lot of abuses.
It has masked the unequal distribution of power existing within the so-called
"private" sphere, where physical, economic, and other gendered differences in
power profoundly effect the situation and prospects of women and men. One
obvious implication of placing sexual affiliation in the same realm of rules that
govern strangers in society would be that marriage would no longer serve as a
defense to rape. It also would be impermissible for police and other state
personnel to conceptually bracket off some assaults and label them "domestic"
violence (therefore Jess serious than the undomesticated variety). Perhaps we
might see the development of tort principles applied to sexual affiliates in the
context of certain conduct clearly unacceptable when one is dealing with
strangers-for example, harassment, assault, intimidation, and emotional abuse.
Far beyond a mere call for private ordering through contract, the abolition of
marriage suggests a more profound regulatory scheme-one that would afford
married women the same protection the unmarried have.
There are a lot of issues raised in the context of this suggestion for abolishing
marriage as a legal category. One set of questions has to do with the implications
of referring interactions of sexual affiliates to existing doctrinal schemes of
contract, tort, property, criminal law, equity, and so on. For example, how would
these areas of law change if they had to be applied to sexual affiliates? What
would the inclusion of this category of litigants do to current understandings and

4. Professor, Columbia University School of Law.
5. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
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acceptance of the premises and assumptions underlying these areas of law?
Certainly it is reasonable to conclude that there would have to be some (perhaps
extensive) reconsideration of doctrinal assertions about things like duty or
bargaining power, for example.
Even if we focus purely on the private ordering aspect of this discussion, there
are important public-policy and regulatory issues that arise if there is no legal
significance to marriage. If private ordering is desirable as to some issues in
regard to sexual affiliates, then there are arguments for expanding the reach of
contract to all areas of intimate life in lieu of special marriage rules. Why not
include in the ability to contract events and interactions in which women are
historically (and stereotypically) viewed as having a natural "monopoly" or as
possessing more in the way of supply than they do in demand? Specifically, what
about relegating to private ordering issues concerning reproduction and sex? If
we want private ordering, we should abolish laws against prostitution and give
women an option to charge for their sexual services. Perhaps we should also
allow women to charge for gestational and other reproductive services. Gifts of
reproductive labor might be appropriate, but compensation could be demanded,
negotiated, and legally enforced. Certainly women should be able to contract as
to ultimate custody and control of children in return for their investment in
reproduction. Contract could ensure that nurturers were entitled to the benefits
of their labors--custody of the child even if the noncaretaking biological parent
wants to make a contrary claim. In fact, why not really privatize this area,
removing obstacles and burdens now associated with pregnancy outside of
marriage? We now invade an unmarried woman's privacy and use a lot of energy
trying to get women to name a father even in cases where neither parent wants
the tie established. There continue to be legal, medical, and social impediments
for a single woman's use of sperm banks.
One area of extensive current regulation that would be open for
reconsideration (and ultimate privatization) were marriage to be abolished,
concerns nontraditional sexual affiliations. If there is no longer one statepreferred and -protected form of sexual affiliation (marriage), what would be the
rationale for the state prohibiting nonmonogamous, heterosexual preferences and
choices? Why not leave same-sex relationships, even group or plural
"marriages," to individual or private arrangements?
As interesting as these types of questions might be to explore in the context of
thinking about leaving intimacy to private ordering, it seems to me that there is
another, more pressing issue to explore. If we are seriously considering the
abolition of marriage as a legal category, it calls under critical examination the
existing relationship between the institution of marriage and our definition of the
nature and role of the state. I am particularly interested in the role that marriage
has vis-OL-vis the state. Once we consider abolishing marriage as a legal category,
turning it over to private ordering, it becomes clear that the institution currently
serves a significant social function. On ideological and rhetorical levels,
marriage is the means whereby the state effectively privatizes dependency. The
fact that the marital family is the repository for dependency in our grand social
scheme explains why there has been so much valorization, protection, and
concern for this particular relationship. Marriage is a public institution; it is
constructed as a complement to the state, the mechanism through which we can
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avoid assuming collective (or state-assumed) responsibility for dependent
members of our society. The institution of marriage, therefore, is essential for the
capitalistic myths of individualism, self-sufficiency, and autonomy to be played
out. Without marriage we would have to confront the realities of dependency.
I have been working on developing a complex theory of dependency. While
time constraints prohibit extended discussion here, the major premise of my
analysis is that dependency is inevitable. By inevitable, I mean that dependency
is a biological phenomenon. As a biological and developmental concept,
dependency is also universal. All human beings were dependent as infants and
children, and many of us will be dependent in the future as we age, grow ill, or
become disabled. Dependency must first be understood, therefore, as a universal,
inevitable category. But there is another, important, dimension to dependency.
If biological dependency is inevitable and universal, "derivative" dependency is
not. The concept of derivative dependency is premised on the simple but obvious
fact that caretakers (those who assume responsibility for inevitable dependency)
are dependent upon social and economic resources in order to fulfill their
caretaking tasks. And, while inevitable dependency is universal, derivative
dependency is culturally assigned to only some members of our society. This
raises obvious questions about how that assignment is done and prompts
consideration of the conditions under which caretakers should be expected by the
society to undertake responsibility for inevitable dependency. Historically,
caretakers have been referred to the private family for those resources necessary
for caretaking. And, within those families, caretaking has been done, often at the
sacrifice of individual autonomy and economic achievement.
The obvious realization when we think about dependency in this more
complicated way is that the private family as an institution, and individual family
members who consume and depend upon caretaking work within families
(husbands, children, elderly parents, and so on), cannot accurately be described
as self-sufficient and independent. Within that family structure the labor of the
caretaker is appropriated to the advantage of the individual family members in
the first instance and to the larger good of business and government in the long
run. Domestic labor reproduces the world-produces consumers, students,
employees, and voters. In the course of providing caretaking, potential individual
economic accomplishments are routinely sacrificed or compromised. Dependency
may be privatized, but only at the expense of this caretaker.
The individual that is the subject of liberal as well as economic analysis can
only be theorized as self-sufficient when dependency is hidden within the
family-when it is privatized. This is an exploitative model. It is also a model
that is failing in contemporary society. Marriage is no longer able to serve its
historic role as the repository for dependency. This is true for several reasons.
The first is the widespread dissatisfaction with marriage which is expressed in
the divorce rate as well as by the increasing number of women-particularly
women from relatively middle-class backgrounds with some college
education-choosing to become single mothers (reproduce outside the context
of marriage). These behavior trends are related to the second reason that family
no longer suffices as comprehensive social policy when it comes to dependency:
women's aspirations and their expectations for themselves have changed. We are
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no longer willing to accept domestic labor and caretaking as our primary
responsibility-we have a more egalitarian model in mind.
To bring all this back to the issue at hand-private ordering and family law-I
support the privatization of sexual affiliation in all its manifestations. This is
what has been happening in terms of the economic consequences of marriage and
in dissolution anyway. Privatization by undermining marital status as a legal
consequence has important public consequences that will mean the provision of
better protection for women. But, as we privatize adult family relationships, it
becomes apparent that we must consider what will happen to dependency now
hidden within rhetoric about the function of families. The next question for
contract might well be: given the new realities, how should we rewrite the social
contract in order to ensure collective or state responsibility for inevitable
dependency?
AKHIL REED AMAR

6

The answer to public-versus-private is obviously both-a more complete
answer depends on the particular kind of question at issue, and we need to
identify some of the relevant constitutional values. There are public concerns that
I think Greg Alexander7 very powerfully articulated-of dignity, I would add
equality-and then there are all sorts of opportunities for private ordering
because one size does not always fit all. So let me go through three or four
different issues and how I would resolve in each context the public-private
question, and in the context of that I will try to respond to the two papers that we
have heard about this morning." Very interesting papers. I have some questions
about both of them, from different perspectives.
To begin with, let's talk about who can marry, a question that got asked about
same-sex marriage. I would think that would be a pretty good occasion for
private ordering: you pick the person that you love, and you want to spend the
rest of your life with. In the spirit of private ordering, one size does not fit all
here, and we let people organize their lives. I happen to also think that that would
fit with norms of gender equality, getting rid of discrimination on the basis of sex
or sexual orientation. (Perhaps heterosexism is a form of sexism.) On that ground
some other forms of private ordering involving more than two persons could be
distinguished perhaps. The current regime says "two persons but only if they are
one man and one woman," and that seems to me a sex discrimination; broader
situations involving more than two-polygamy or polyandry, or Bob and Carol
and Ted and Alice and all of that-might have private ordering on their side,
perhaps, but not quite the gender equality argument. So we would have to decide
what the relevant contributions of those two concepts are. So let me now move
to the marriage contract itself, Eric and Jeff's paper.9

6. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
7. See Gregory S. Alexander, The New Marriage Contract and the Limits of Private

Ordering,73 IND. L.J. 503 (1998).
8. See id; Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding andMonitoring

Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393 (1998).
9. See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 3.
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And since we were talking about traditional marriage, let me remind you of
some of the things actually that traditional marriage was about. It was very
gendered, of course. The woman was obliged to provide, in effect, sexual
services to the husband. Failure to do that, I guess, was a kind of desertion or
fault. It was a kind of contract that she entered into once and if you think that you
can make an agreement to never rescind your consent thereafter, then this is a
one-time consent in the marriage contract itself to be raped, maritally, by your
husband; and so that should make us a little uneasy about certain kinds of
agreements that you make in the marriage contract, that you can never try to
rescind your consent to thereafter. Robin West has written very thoughtfully
about that. I would want to bring in the Thirteenth Amendment as a constitutional
value that helps adjudicate-it is about private ordering, in part, and about limits
on private ordering, too, in the name of dignity and equality. Since the
hypothetical was raised-by Mark Ramseyer, to the right of even Eric, on this
question of spouse beating-let me remind you that traditional marriage gave a
husband a right, maybe even a duty, of moderate discipline and chastisement.
That is where we get the proverbial "rule of thumb," that he could beat her with
a stick so long as the stick was not bigger than a thumb in diameter. Question: his
thumb, her thumb, or the judge's thumb? I am not quite sure about whose
chancellor's foot we are talking about here, but that's traditional marriage, and
it should make us again think about where we draw the line. This was what Jeff
was asking: when do we and don't we allow people to contract into things, and
contract into things irrevocably.
Then there is a whole set of law-and-economics issues that we could raise,
again about possible limits of private ordering. Greg, I think, talked about a
couple of them. The real problem here, from a law-and-economics perspective,
is somewhat similar to corporations (we might conceptualize the corporation as
a nexus of contracts). There is a real problem of renegotiation thereafter,
amending the corporate charter, and here is the dilemma: if you allow
renegotiation you can have renegotiation in the shadow of all sorts of threat
advantage, but in a relational contract that is ongoing, many things cannot be
well specified ex ante. One horn of this dilemma is what Eric was saying, that
there is a problem about allowing renegotiation. On the other hand, if you
prohibit renegotiation, that creates all sorts of problems, too, that Jeff identified,
and that may very well mean that there are genuine limits on the ability of private
ordering because this is a relational contract. Not everything can be specified.
The number of permutations is just so vast. How many children are you going to
have, what order, how they are going to be spaced out, what the economy is like,
your relative job skills, health issues. Children may have special needs, and we
cannot guarantee how all of these things are going to come out. And so that does,
to some degree, limit the ability of the ex ante contract, really, in a relational
world, where lots of things need to be worked out, to be specified.
I am in favor of the following kind of private ordering: that in the interior of
the marriage, judges should not be constantly intervening to enforce contracts,
especially in a specific-performance-like way. "You must provide sexual
services. You must submit to this beating. You must provide dinner at 8 p.m."
And there are Thirteenth Amendment reasons that limit the enforcement of
certain kinds of private contracts, voluntarily entered into. Historically, if we talk
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about indentured servitude, you agreed to be someone's slave for seven years,
and under one model that was voluntary, since you agreed at the outset, so long
as you did not bind yourself to more than seven years. But after the Civil War,
the time point at which we actually looked at consent was not the time you
entered into this contract of adhesion, but when the performance was demanded
and you wanted to get out of it. That actually was an evolution of our
understanding of involuntary servitude. At what point do we look at consent as
voluntary, ex ante or ex post?
Now finally, on dissolution and private ordering-again there are some
specific-performance issues here. Would we prevent people from remarrying
others if they so contracted, forever, or keep them chained into a relationship that
is very unfree, forever? There are some genuine Thirteenth Amendment issues
here. And finally, that brings me, thinking about dissolution, to children, the
Brinig and Buckley paper, and what is in the best interests of children. I am a
little bit more dubious of these joint-custody arrangements, especially mandatory
ones, not just mandatory on the courts, as Saul Levmore ° was talking about, but
what are we, first of all, mandating on the parties? And one question might be,
should this be something you can opt into or out of at the outset, Rasmussen-andStake-like. But there are other questions, too. Suppose the father does not want
to do this. Are you going to impose mandatory visits and joint custody on him?
No, you cannot under the Thirteenth Amendment force on him a relationship that
he does not want. But now you are forcing it on the mother, in some ways, who
is forced to be in a relationship, to hang around while her luggage is waiting to
arrive, and this makes for difficulty. The husband might have been abusive,
although not in a way that you could prove in court, and now you have ongoing
judicial monitoring of all of this. Every dispute has to go to a judge who says to
a woman, "You can move out of state or not," and now we have judges telling
women, typically, where they can live, can they remarry, with whom, what job
can they take, can they move out of state, and this starts to raise for me some
genuine Thirteenth-Amendment-like concerns.
The Goldsteins, in their book, suggest that this is not in the best interests of the
children, too, when it is imposed by the law rather than agreed to and worked out
by the parties. Their model, and here I will close, is of a certain kind of strong
preference for private ordering. The law lets people marry, and then once they
are married the law sort of withdraws, and lets them try to work things out in the
interior, and then when they cannot agree, when there are irreconcilable
differences, and they cannot agree on custody, they come to court, and the law
makes a one-time decision. It names the referee, the mom or the dad, and then
withdraws and now we have a new intact family unit, and maybe we should, in
that decision, pick one person-the primary caregiver. This might be a good
mandatory rule on the courts, something like what Elizabeth Scott or something
close I think to what maybe Martha Fineman has to say. And then the law
withdraws, so that you do not have ongoing judicial monitoring every time there
is a disagreement about Robocop, or about what the child eats, even though the
child may be very confused by these two people telling her or him very different

10. See Saul Levmore, Joint Custody and Strategic Behavior, 73 IND. L.J. 429 (1998).
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things about how to grow up, about where you can live and the like. And let's
separate all those issues from the money issue, because judges can, and the law
can, say to him, "You have to pay more because your opportunities were created
as a result of this initial partnership." And so rather than a lump sum (50%
settlement of what you have at dissolution), 50% of your future earnings really
should go to her instead, because all these opportunities were created initially
during this partnership, thinking about it as a partnership model.
REGINA AUSTIN"

Ours is a society characterized by a great deal of status or social group
stratification. The groups may be bound by various characteristics including race,
ethnicity, class, gender, religion, and sexual orientation. The groups are arranged
in a social hierarchy. However fixed the hierarchy may seem, and however
accepting of their relative lot the inhabitants of this hierarchy might appear, there
is much cultural conflict between groups and within groups. Underlying this
conflict is a fierce, though often covert (especially covert in this society),
struggle over political power and, more importantly, material resources. The state
is not neutral in this war. The hierarchy would not exist without state-driven or
state-sanctioned oppression, repression, and discrimination.
In some cases, the state usurps the power of private citizens and the groups to
which they belong to structure their'family lives and to live a good life with
material resources adequate to the task. The law's impact is not limited to one or
two areas of family life; it is pervasive. For such individuals and groups, family
law is criminal law, tort law, immigration law, welfare law, public-housing law,
health law, etc. For such individuals and groups, the quest for private ordering,
as opposed to public control or regulation, of family life becomes relevant with
regard to a number of practices, including: informal adoptions; informal
establishment of paternity; group-controlled divorce mechanisms; rites of
passage like circumcision, female genital surgery, or gang membership; the
regulation of dating, courtship, and marriage, including arranged marriages and
polygamy; the disciplining of children and domestic violence; accountability for
the criminal or violent acts of family members; child labor; and alternative
medicine and consent to medical care.
As far as I can tell, being free of state regulation in these areas is not, strictly
speaking, what family-law scholars consider "public ordering." This leads me to
think that the concept may need to be opened up a bit. Private ordering in the
contractarian mode assumes that the parties have a certain level of material,
social, and political security-not equality, but a minimum or floor-that simply
does not apply across the board. Moreover, as I understand it, private ordering
according to the contract model involves some relinquishment of the state's
authority to impose moral values on family life. But this abdication seems to
reflect a certain smugness about the pervasiveness of white, Judeo-Christian,
bourgeois, mainstream values that are grounded in the supposed rationality,
efficiency, and flexibility of modernity as opposed to the emotionalism and

11. William A. Schnader Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
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rigidity of traditional cultures that operate according to different or antithetical
belief systems. Tradition may be just what some groups and the families that
belong to them want to uphold. Tradition, of course, should not necessarily be
viewed as a static element, since culture generally changes with material
conditions, and traditions accordingly evolve over time as well.
"Private ordering" could be a way of expanding the power of groups to exert
influence in the domain of family life in situations where the state now intercedes
to ill effect. There are three things that social groups can do to enhance or
diminish family life: (1) they can insulate families and individuals from the
oppressive power of the state; (2) they can isolate individuals from the
potentially liberating protections of the state's laws; and (3) they can act as a
conduit for the distribution of the state's resources to families and individuals.
More "private ordering" in support of the first and last functions is justifiable.
Private ordering in support of the second is not. Thus, to the extent that social
groups create the spiritual and political context for family life, and allow for the
maximizing or husbanding of material resources, they should have a role in an
evolving law applicable to families.
Demographics may be the biggest factor working in the direction of private
ordering via social groups. The "new American family" may turn out to be a
family composed of new Americans whose values, material circumstances, and
social organization are not compatible with a vision of intrafamily freedom based
on individual bargaining. The new American family may be, as well, old
American families that want to pursue a culturally distinctive way of life with
others similarly situated. The question is whether there is a role for private
ordering in the conducting of their affairs.
THOMAS S. ULEN

12

My specialty is law and economics, and I shall approach the subject of this
conference by attempting to show how economic analysis might contribute to an
assessment of the prospects for private ordering in family law. But let me begin
with a disclaimer: I know almost nothing about family law. Most of what I do
know I have learned in the few hours of this Symposium. However, I believe that
my remarks will be so general, and the tools of economics are so flexible, that my
ignorance of the particularities of family law will constitute only a partial
impediment to my contributing to this distinguished panel.' 3
The focus of this Symposium is the extent to which private ordering can help
to evaluate the ability of consensual agreements to address the issues of the new
American family. My aim is to elaborate two points on these matters. First, I

12. Alumni Distinguished Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, and Professor,
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I
would like to thank Jeff Stake and his colleagues at the Indiana University School of Law for
their hospitality and help in preparing this discussion.
13. There has been some fascinating writing from a law-and-economics perspective on the
family. In addition to works by the members of this panel, there are GARY S. BECKER, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAviOR (1976), GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE
FAMILY (rev. & enlarged ed. 1991), and RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
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want to assert that the central tool of law and economics-rational choice
theory-can help us understand the possibilities and limitations of private
ordering in family law. This will involve a brief exposition of the economics of
freedom of contract, with special reference to family-law matters. Additionally,
I shall try to show how one might incorporate some more recent developments
in rational choice theory into an evaluation of private ordering and the family.
Second, I want to suggest how an economic analysis might explain some of the
changes giving rise to the "new American family" and to suggest how a broader
scope for private ordering might accommodate these and other changes in family
structure more than would be the case in a legal regime that relied less on private
ordering.
RationalChoice Theory Generally
Let me begin with a very brief summary of rational choice theory. That theory
assumes, first, that human decisionmakers can compute the costs and benefits of
alternatives open to them, and second, that human decisionmakers have stable,
well-ordered (transitive) preferences. 4 These assumptions imply that human
decisionmakers behave so as to rationally maximize as many of their preferences
as relevant constraints allow them to do.
To understand how decisionmakers might be said to behave in accordance with
this theory, we need to examine decisions from an ex ante perspective, rather
than from an ex post viewpoint. That is, investigators ought to evaluate decisions
of rational maximization on the basis of how the decisionmaker perceived his or
her options before actually taking the decision. Whether or not the decision turns
out after the fact to have been a good one is not irrelevant, but it is also not
central to the usefulness of rational choice theory. For instance, rational choice
theory would ask us to evaluate the decision to marry or cohabit on the basis of
the partners' perceived costs and benefits prior to the decision, not on the basis
of whether the partnership failed or lasted a lifetime.
Where there is uncertainty about the future-as, of course, there almost always
is-the relevant version of rational choice theory is "expected utility theory."
Expected utility theory hypothesizes that human beings can make consistent
estimates of the probabilities of each of the various outcomes of the alternative
courses of action open to them,' 5 that they can estimate the dollar value of the
alternative outcomes, and that they have preferences about risky outcomes-that
is, they are risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-preferring. Decisionmakers then
choose among uncertain outcomes in such a way as to maximize their expected
utility.
The applicability of rational choice theory to explicit market decisions
(whether certain or uncertain decisions) seems straightforward. What is novel

14. Preferences are transitive when the statements "Ais preferred to B" and "B is preferred
to C" imply that "A is preferred to C."
15. For the purposes of the theory it does not matter whether those probability estimates
are objective or subjective. They merely need to obey the probability calculus, which requires,
among other things, that the probabilities of all mutually exclusive outcomes add up to one.
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about law and economics (and other innovative uses of the theory, as in political
science) is its use of rational choice theory to look at nonmarket decisions. As a
brief example of the application of rational choice theory to a legal issue,
consider the decision to commit a crime. Potential criminals may be thought to
compare the expected costs and the expected benefits of the crime. They will
commit a crime if their perception is that the expected benefits of committing the
crime exceed the expected costs and will refrain from committing the crime if
their perception is that the expected costs exceed the expected benefits. There is
a straightforward implication for criminal-justice policy: we may deter crime by
structuring sanctions so that potential criminals perceive the expected costs as
exceeding the expected benefits.
Let us assume that legal rules should foster efficient behavior. Speaking very
broadly, law and economics argues that social efficiency will result from the
behavior of rational maximizers unless certain well-defined impediments to their
achieving that efficiency are present. Those impediments are deviations from
competition, public goods, external costs and benefits, and asymmetric
information. I shall not torture you with explaining why these are impediments.
Let me simply make a couple of general points. First, please note that these
impediments do not say anything at all about imperfections in the cognitive
abilities of decisiomakers. (We shall come back to this distinction in a moment.)
Rather, the impediments on which I am here focusing drive a wedge between
private and social optimality; that is, they create a difference between what the
individual maximizer will do and what society would like her to do. Second, I
think that only two impediments are salient with respect to private ordering in
family law-namely, external costs and benefits and asymmetric information. I
shall show why they are salient in just a moment.
Rational Choice, PrivateOrdering,and the Family
How does all this apply to the issue of private ordering within family law? One
important implication is that prospective partners in an affective relationship
should be given a great deal of latitude in arranging their affairs. For example,
they ought to be allowed to conclude prenuptial agreements, conditions for
dissolving the partnership, and custody arrangements for children in accordance
with their lawful preferences, subject to the usual contract-formation defenses
and performance excuses.' 6
To what extent do these rational parties need assistance from the law in
structuring their agreements? Perhaps the law ought to supplement these private
consensual agreements by providing majoritarian, off-the-shelf, default rules,"

16. These matters are explored in MIcHAEL J.TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITs OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACr 43-57 (1993), Brinig & Buckley, supra note 8, Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 3,
and Michael J.Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, The Role ofPrivate Orderingin Family Law:
A Law andEconomics Perspective,41 U. TORONTO L.J. 533 (1991).
17. That is, rules that the majority of parties would agree to, if they had thought of the
matter. For example, if parties thought to include terms about custody in the event of divorce,
the vast majority of them would probably think to provide that the primary caregiver receive
custody of the children when they are young and joint custody as the children grow older.
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and, in a few cases, following Stake's proposal, mandatory rules.' 8 To decide
when these rules are necessary, we need to return to the relevant criteria for
intervention in private decisionmaking noted above: external effects and
asymmetric information. Consider these in turn. The external effects with which
the law is principally concerned are external costs. As an example, consider the
alleged dire consequences that might result when close relatives have children.
Law can improve matters by forbidding even consensual arrangements between
close relatives. Similarly, societies typically impose minimum ages on legitimate
marriage. Another example would be the costs that society would bear if a
partner to a marriage were to be left destitute and a ward of the state if her
partner sought to defraud or disinherit her. Finally, consider that many societies
stigmatize a child born out of wedlock; to minimize these stigmata society might
encourage marriages to occur and make marriage a precondition for
childbearing. 9
Where there are external benefits from an activity, purely consensual
agreements will not provide for enough of the benefit-generating activity. An
example might be that, left to their own devices, parents might prefer their
children to work rather than to study. Society, however, would prefer that more
children be educated. Therefore, law might intervene in privately ordered family
agreements to forbid child labor or failure to educate children. Many societies
have sought to realize the external benefits of stable familial relations by
outlawing polygamy and polyandry and by seeking to confine sexual behavior
within the institution of marriage by forbidding adultery, rape, prostitution, and
the seduction of children.2"
The third ground for intervention in private agreements about family matters
is the presence of asymmetric information. This means, simply, that there are
situations in which a party has information relevant to another party but does not
have an incentive to divulge that information. For instance, in prenuptial

18. The distinction in law and economics is that parties may contract away from default
rules but not from mandatory rules. Stake has argued in favor of the following mandatory rule:
parties must submit a plan for dissolution of the partnership as a condition of marriage. See
Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planningfor Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397 (1992).
19. Naturally, this is extremely difficult to do. The federal welfare-reform legislation that
took effect July 1, 1997 sought to reduce out-of-wedlock births in various ways. See Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105; id. sec. I 16(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 2181. For instance, § 103(a)(1) allows for a bonus
in the federal block grant for temporary assistance to needy families to be given to those states
that reduce their illegitimate births. Id. sec. 103(a)(1), § 403(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 2118-19.
Section 103(a)(1) also provides that no assistance may be given to teenage parents who do not
attend high school or an equivalent training program. Id. sec. 103(a)(1), § 408(a)(4), 110 Stat.
at 2135-36. Moreover, § 103(a)(1) requires, as a condition of support, that teenage parents live
in an adult-supervised setting, id.sec. 103(a)(1), § 408(a)(5), 110 Stat. at 2136-37, and § 905
requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services, by January 1, 1997, to establish and
implement a strategy for preventing out-of-wedlock teenage pregnancies and for assuring that
25 percent of communities in the United States have programs for teenage-pregnancy
prevention, id sec. 905, 110 Stat. at 2349.
20. For economic elaborations on these and other restrictions, see generally POSNER, supra
note 13.
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agreements one party could not defraud the other by failing to disclose relevant
information (e.g., the presence of valuable assets). One can think of other legal
interventions into consensual partnership arrangements that are designed to
minimize the inefficiencies attendant upon asymmetric information.
Recent Developments in Rational Choice and Their
Applicability to Family Law

The question to which I now want to turn is the possibility that law and
economics might say more. The central issue, it seems to me, is to ask if
economics can provide additional reasons beyond external effects and
asymmetric information for believing that private parties are incapable of
structuring their familial affairs in a mutually beneficial way. And if so, what
implications do those additional grounds have for private ordering in family law?
One way to look at this issue is to ask the question, "Can economics, and
rational choice theory in particular, give an account of how human beings might
make mistakes in consensual agreements?" The standard rational choice theory
says that mistakes arise only because of external factors: asymmetric
information, external effects, monopoly, and the like. And that those mistakes are
not mistakes of individual cognition, but, rather, mistakes of aligning individual
with social desire. What I want to suggest are some reasons why individuals
might make systematic-mistakes about their own well-being.
What are these reasons for mistakes, and what effects will they have on family
law? Painting with a very, very broad brush, I have in mind the sorts of mistakes
that Gregory Alexander referred to this morning as cognitive limitations or
cognitive illusions. There is a very large literature on this topic. Let me mention
two of the cognition problems that are relevant to a consideration of the limits of
consensual agreements. First, psychologists suggest that most human
decisionmakers are overconfident in that they almost always exaggerate
optimistic or favorable outcomes or assessments. If that is true, there are clear
implications for the rational choice theory of criminal behavior or of bankruptcy,
and of our topic here today-the ability of consensual agreements to provide
socially optimal family relationships. For example, decisionmakers are likely to
exaggerate the likelihood that their partnership will not dissolve, that they will
be good parents, that they will not get ill and be unable to contribute to their
family's well-being, and so on. As a result, they may not provide for any of these
contingencies. Law can improve private ordering by seeking to encourage
prospective partners to be more realistic about these unpleasant outcomes and
providing appropriately for them.
Second, empirical evidence has identified other cognitive limitations that have
given rise to questions about the suitability of expected utility theory for
describing decisionmaking under uncertainty and an alternative called "prospect
theory."'" Prospect theory is to be distinguished from expected utility theory on

21. On prospect theory, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect
Theory: CumulativeRepresentationof Uncertainty,5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992). For
a general overview of overconfidence, prospect theory, and other cognitive limitations, see
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two grounds. First, the frame of reference for making decisions about uncertain
outcomes is the status quo. Decisionmakers evaluate uncertain courses of action
according to whether they lead to losses or gains from their present situation.
Second, decisionmakers are "loss-averse." Loss aversion arises because people
apparently treat gains and losses from the status quo differently (and differently
from what expected utility theory would predict to be the case). Specifically,
people are risk-averse with respect to gains but risk-seeking with respect to
losses. If we give someone a choice between (1) receiving $50 with certainty and
(2) a 50% chance of gaining $100 and a 50% chance of gaining nothing, he will
probably prefer the certainty of $50. However, if we give that same person the
choice between (1) a certain loss of $50 and (2) a 50% chance of losing $100 and
a 50% chance of losing nothing, he will choose to take the gamble. That sort of
behavioral regularity is not explained by expected utility theory, and yet it is
important for us to recognize that the regularity has some important legal
consequences. For example, if prospect theory is an accurate description of how
people approach uncertain courses of action, an implication is that people may
prefer litigation to settlement or bargain vigorously rather than lightly, where
losses are in store. Perhaps that means, as suggested by Professor Estin this
morning, that postdissolution negotiation may not succeed, and may not occur to
the degree that expected utility theory would otherwise predict.
Let me summarize these two points. If people generally suffer from the two
cognitive limitations that I have here mentioned-overconfidence and loss
aversion, then the implications of these are for emendations in the broad scope
delegated to consensual agreements to order the affairs of people in affective
relations. Because individuals may make mistakes in consensual agreements and
may fight more vigorously to avoid losses than they would to realize gains,
family law should craft default and mandatory rules so as to achieve socially
optimal affective relationships.
PrivateOrderingand Changes in the Structure ofthe
Family
One of the focuses of this Symposium has been the appearance of the "new
American family." Can economics explain why the average familial relationship
changes over time in society, and how, if at all, private ordering can
accommodate or stall those changes? In economics, secular social changes occur
because of changes in technology or in preferences. 22 As examples of how a
change in technology can affect a family-law issue, consider the facts that it is
now much cheaper to establish paternity than it used to be and that the
technology for controlling pregnancy is much cheaper and more accessible than
was the case thirty years ago. Both of these developments have had profound
effects on affective relations generally and familial relationships particularly. As

ScoTr PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING

22. See generally
forces.

POSNER,

(1993).

supra note 13, for examples of changes brought on by these
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examples of changing tastes, consider society's apparently increasing tolerance
for divorce, adultery, and homosexual partnerships.
How does private ordering confound or accommodate these changes? My
intuition is that the greater the scope for private ordering, then the more open
society is to changes. To see this, imagine the contrary-namely, that there is
small scope for private ordering. For example, if there are public laws against the
recognition of homosexual marriage or laws requiring divorce in the event of a
complaint of adultery, then it will be very difficult to alter matters if society's
mores change so as to make either homosexual marriage or adultery less
objectionable. But if partners are relatively free (within the limits mentioned
earlier) to craft their own agreements, they will be able to craft consensual
agreements that reflect these changes. And surely they will be able to do so far
more flexibly than will courts or legislatures.
That being said, one should also recognize that this flexibility comes at a cost.
Some changes caused by technology and altered preferences may have
deleterious external costs that invite legal intervention. For instance, one might
well argue that the social costs of the advanced technology for controlling
pregnancy have been considerable.
MICHAEL GROSSBERG

Like everyone else on the panel, I struggled with the question of what I might
add to this discussion. As I thought about it, I remembered a story that I would
like to share. About twenty years ago, Stanton Wheeler of Yale Law School and
David Rothman of Columbia University's history department held a conference
on history and social policy. They were concerned about the lack of historical
context and understanding in contemporary policy debates. They gathered
together a group of leading historians of American social policy. At the
conference, the historians each took the podium and talked about their particular
policy issue before an audience of policymakers from various fields. As the
historians spoke, a common refrain emerged. Whether the historian talked about
schooling or crime or medicine, he or she contended that the history of the
subject was very complicated, contained multiple concerns, and had multiple and
even contradictory meanings. Finally a policymaker in the audience was
exasperated by these common historical tales. He jumped up and declared,
"When I have a problem, I want it addressed; I want costs calculated, solutions
proposed. Historians bleed too much."23
Well after having spent many years mucking around family law's history, as
my contribution to this Roundtable I guess that I want to spill a little blood. Like
my colleagues twenty years ago, I want to say that the past does indeed speak to
the issue before us. I think that it tells us that private ordering in family law is
not new, and that it has a complicated past that has helped produce the equally
complicated present in which we struggle over its meaning. And furthermore, I
want to suggest that by treating private ordering in family law as a new

23. SOCIAL HISTORY AND SOCIAL POLICY at iv (David J.Rothman & Stanton Wheeler eds.,
1981).
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phenomenon we simplify its complications at our, and too often, at others', peril.
Consequently, it seems to me that one contribution I might make to this
discussion is to try to give a little perspective on the present urge to give
privileged place to private ordering in American family law by looking
backwards.
And as I thought about how to do that, the first conclusion I reached was that
the question of this Roundtable seemed misdirected. Rather than asking whether
private ordering should be the dominant new force in American family law, I
want to suggest that we ask two other questions. Why have there always been
conflicts over private ordering in American family law? And why do we have
another outbreak of these conflicts at this particular moment in time? After
rephrasing the question in this manner, I want to begin suggesting how these two
questions might be answered by arguing that we have inherited a persistent and
consistent debate about private ordering in family law. This debate has been
embedded in the historical record, and it can be recovered and used not only to
examine the past but also to broaden our understanding of the present while we
contest the future. So I would like to explain briefly how debates about private
ordering in family law have been framed, offer a few examples of how such
debates have waged in the past, and then suggest how those past stories might be
read in the present.
I want to begin by explaining how I think debates about private ordering in
family law have been framed. American family law has developed in a series of
significant time-bound stages or periods. These range from what I would call its
fundamental reconfiguration in the postrevolutionary era and its initial
conceptualization as the law of domestic relations in the 1870s, to the basic
alterations of the post-World War II era and the conflicts of the present. In each
of these eras, however, private ordering has been a primary concern and its role
in family law debated, often quite fiercely. Two critical considerations framed
those debates.
First, Americans have generally talked about private ordering by using the
metaphor of balancing. Teeter-totter-like we have always talked about the issue
in terms of balancing individual and family rights and autonomy on one side, and
state interests, legitimation, and regulation on the other; and we still do. For
instance, the right to wed on one side, and the legitimate state interest in
regulating marital choice on the other. And, equally important, as far as I know,
there has never been a time in which there was complete unanimity for tilting the
law in only one way. Quite the contrary, there have always been contests about
which way the law ought to tilt, and the past is littered with examples of conflicts
over the proper balance that should be struck between individual rights and state
interests. Some of these have been more severe and profound than have others.
As a result, the debate about the proper role of private ordering in family law is
a very long one.
Second, contests over the proper balance in family law between public and
private interests erupted because of time-bound concerns raised by the constant
reality of American family diversity. That is, there is not now, nor has there ever
been, a single American family. Instead there are and there always have been a
wide range of family forms and choices. Debates over private ordering-about
how to balance the family-law teeter-totter between public and private-have
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focused on the legal standing of these various family forms. Specifically, I read
the record of the past as saying that there have been constant conflicts between
what I would call "functional families" and "ideological families." By
"functional families" I mean the various ways women, men, and children actually
lived; and by "ideological families" I mean the family configurations embedded
in statutes, legal doctrine, administrative regulations, and other public narratives
of this society. The two family forms coincide at some moments in time, and
clash at others. Throughout American history, conflicts over the status of the
two, particularly over the status of functional families, have continually upset the
legal balance and spilled out into the public sphere, and helped ignite battles over
private ordering in family law.24
In short, I want to argue that struggles over the balance between public and
private interests provoked by conflicts over functional and ideological families
have constantly and consistently framed debates about private ordering in
American family law. We are engaged in one such debate right now. And thus I
think an understanding of this persistent way of framing the issue is critical to
any discussion of the subject. Recognizing the nature of this way of framing the
issue also underscores the inherently unstable, contingent, and subjective nature
of all such debates, including those in our own time. It helps us understand why
there have been generational but not permanent solutions to these conflicts. I
want to develop this argument a bit more fully by offering three brief, disparate
examples from a family-law past littered with such conflicts.
My first example addresses the role of private ordering in marital choice.
Marital choice raises a number of concerns about balancing public and private
interests that always have the potential to provoke controversy and conflict: Who
can wed? How will a marriage be solemnized? Which marriages will receive the
state stamp of legitimacy and approval? Which unions will have the full rights
and privileges of matrimony? As I read the record of marriage law in nineteenthcentury America, two very different sets of answers were given to these
questions.
The first answer came in the antebellum era. The preponderance of official and
lay opinion tilted the family-law teeter-totter toward private ordering, or what
then might have been termed "liberty." The result was to give privileged place
to individual decisionmaking in marital choice and to limit state regulation.
Statutory controls on marital choice through regulations that mandated parental
consent, formal ceremonies, licenses, minimum ages, and the like, elicited
endorsement as salutary for individual couples and socially beneficial, but
adherence to these rules was not required for a legally valid marriage. The
creation and the rapid diffusion of common-law marriage epitomized the era's
legal balance in marital choice. Common-law marriage let men and women
determine their own marital partners and at the same time secure state sanction
and privileges for the choices that they made. In short, it institutionalized private
ordering in marital choice. Equally important, the tilt of the era's policies toward

24. For a fuller development of these points, see Michael Grossberg, BalancingActs:
Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family Law, 1890-1990, 28 IND. L. REV. 273
(1995).
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marital-choice rules was also a period story that gave privileged place to
functional families. Intent was the key. The law was encouraged to recognize all
unions that individuals chose to form, from what might be called "conventional"
marriages sanctified in a church wedding to what might now be considered
simply "cohabitation." And yet opposition did exist. Parents, state officials,
clergy, and many others protested the policies, championed greater state
regulation, and contended that excessive nuptial liberty encouraged libertinism.
In a few states resisters succeeded in rejecting common-law marriage. However,
despite the opposition, the dominant tilt in the law was toward private ordering.
Like all balances between state and private interests in American family law,
the antebellum answers to the questions of marital choice proved to be timebound and unstable. Balances in family law always shift with changing legal and
social conditions. And both changed in the late nineteenth century. In the years
after the Civil War, amidst the changes that transformed the republic into an
ethnically and racially diverse urbanized center of industrial capitalism, growing
numbers of Americans concluded that family diversity bred far too many social
problems. Indeed, treating the family as a kind of litmus test of social well-being,
yet another persistent feature of American family law, they considered some
families as sources of social evils. A family crisis erupted and the law's inherited
antebellum balance of private and public interests fell under attack. Efforts to
push the balance away from private choice and toward public regulation
dominated marriage-law debates throughout the era. One result was a burst of
legislation aimed at limiting marital choice through the imposition of new
restrictions on those who sought to wed. These restrictions included mandatory
rules that required higher minimum marital ages, disease checks, waiting periods,
and a variety of other controls that tried to impose a new ideological vision of
marriage on the diverse populace. Successful campaigns for bans on commonlaw marriage epitomized the family-law reform movements of the era. The effort
against private ordering culminated in one of the most powerful exertions of state
intervention into marital choice: first, significant geographical and group
extensions of bans on interracial marriage, and then, a federal campaign against
Mormonism and polygamy. Again, resisters emerged to protest the new tilt in the
law and to defend greater individual choice. However, they could not stop the
imposition of the new restrictions. 5
I think that the conflicts during the nineteenth century over the balance
between private ordering and public interest in marital choice illustrate the way
such debates have been framed in teeter-totter-like terms and in response to
attitudes about functional and ideological families. Every society restricts marital
choice in some fashion. Thus the real issue is always determining what
restrictions should be applied and how they can be justified. And even this brief
rendition of nineteenth-century American experiences in the regulation of marital
choice suggests to me that there is a historical record that tells us that trying to
place stringent limits on what we are calling "private ordering in marital choice"
is inherently repressive. It also convinces me that we should be very careful in

25. For a more detailed discussion see MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 64152 (1985).
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employing one of our standard uses of the past, argument by analogy. By that I
mean, the rhetorical strategy of making a case for a particular policy in the
present by analogizing it to an experience in the past. The most obvious
contemporary issue of marital choice that is fodder for such an argument is the
contentious issue of same-sex unions. In the almost irresistible urge to argue by
historical analogy, I would contend that the most appropriate analogy for debates
about same-sex marriage is the ban on interracial marriage and its demise in
Loving v. Virginia.26 And I would resist using analogizing restrictions on samesex marriages to the ban on polygamous unions and its endorsement in cases like
Reynolds v. UnitedStates. But my main point is that it is through contests over
issues such as selecting the most appropriate and most effective historical
analogy that the past continues to frame present debates about private ordering
in family law.
My second example of past debates about private ordering in family law is a
bit more complicated than marital choice. It deals with the issue of private
ordering in child rearing and the attendant questions of who governs the home
and who holds power within and over the home. And I think it suggests some of
the complications raised by demands for private ordering of families in the past
and thus in the present.
I want to discuss the question of private ordering in child rearing historically
by returning to the family crisis of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In addition to concerns about unrestricted marital choices, fears about
families also focused on child-rearing practices. Those worried by the state of
American homes feared that children were not being raised properly. Fueling
their fears was the constant reality of family diversity produced by the everpresent range of functional American families and by changing notions of child
development. In this case, immigration, urban growth, industrial labor, and a
variety of other factors combined to increase the range of child-rearing practices
in the republic. At the same time, middle-class child experts called for childhood
to be extended and for children to be excluded as much as possible from the
market and from public life. Differing notions of the importance of schooling and
child labor, clashing cultural beliefs about the authority of parents, especially
fathers, contrasting understandings of the economic needs of families, and a
litany of other conflicts flared into disputes over child rearing. They were fed by
stories about abused, neglected, and overworked children. Family savers sought
to end diversity in child rearing through the imposition of state-mandated
uniform standards at the same time that they sought restrictions on marital
choice. In the name of child protection, reformers helped construct new
mechanisms for regulating the internal life of families deemed marginal or
abnormal. They included quasi-public organizations charged with dealing with
child neglect and abuse, juvenile courts, compulsory school laws, child-labor
laws, mothers' pensions, and a variety of other policies and programs that
constituted what political scientist Andrew Polsky has aptly called the "American

26. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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therapeutic state."28 This new complex of public and quasi-public agencies
became the medium for a massi ,e intervention into the homes of those
considered on the social margin, primarily working-class and immigrant families.
It succeeded in rearranging the balance of power between these families and the
state. The goal of uniform family rearing expressed a middle-class ideal of proper
family life and represented an effort to impose that ideal on all households by
limiting the autonomy and authority of proscribed families.
And if that were simply the story, its meaning would be rather clear. Like the
constraints on marital choice imposed at the same time, the new controls on child
rearing could be considered yet another example of unnecessary restrictions on
private ordering in families, and yet another story from the past that tells us to
resist public intervention in the present. However, as I suggested earlier, the tale
is a bit more complicated. If we look at some of the experiences produced by the
actual operation of the new therapeutic state, we can see that like all such
significant changes, it had unintended consequences. Not only did the new rules
and agencies rearrange the balance of power between the state and individual
families-as it was intended to do-it also affected the internal dynamics of
power relations in some families. Most notably, juvenile courts, mothers'
pensions, changes in age-of-consent laws, and kindred reforms became means
through which married women and children challenged the power of husbands
and fathers. Wives and children used'the new therapeutic complex to contest
issues from family finances to youthful sexual independence and to seek
protection from domestic violence and abuse. The record is thus strewn both with
examples of individual family members trying to gain protection and of agents
of the therapeutic state trying to impose middle-class norms and beliefs on many
of those same individuals.2 9
As a result of these mixed experiences, the late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury efforts to create a uniform standard of child rearing by tilting the familylaw balance away from private ordering is a complicated tale filled with mixed
messages and meanings. It does, though, underscore the reality that the
distribution of power within and over the home is always involved in debates
about the balance between private ordering and public regulation in family law,
and the reality that attempts to alter the balance between the two always have
unintended consequences.
As a final example of our inherited way of debating private ordering in family
law, I want to turn to the issue of divorce and specifically no-fault divorce. There
has been a debate in this country about the legitimacy and social utility of divorce
since well before the Revolution. Indeed, that debate has been part of a broader
one that continues to rage throughout western European society. Until the advent
of no-fault, however, fault and notions of morality framed by fault had always
dominated discussions about the proper balance between individual and public
interests in divorce. And, unlike marital choice, the tilt in divorce had always
been toward state regulation and severe limits on private ordering even though

28. See ANDREW JOSEPH POLSKY, THE RISE OF THE THERAPEUTIC STATE (1991).
29. For discussion of these issues, see LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES
(1988); MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS (1995).
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over time divorce became more accessible and more frequent. At the same time,
the historical record is complicated by the fact that the act of divorce itself and
its frequency and rules have consistently been considered measures of the wellbeing of the larger society rather than merely the products of claims for marital
freedom by individuals. Divorce has thus been a barometer of conflicts within
law and society over the issues at the heart of debates over private ordering in
family law. These include the limits of individual autonomy, the sanctity of
marriage, the public interest in preserving families, and the responsibilities of
parents. In short, despite its growing acceptance over time, divorce has always
been considered much more of a socially sanctioned privilege than an individual
right like the choice to wed. The debate about private ordering in divorce was
framed accordingly; indeed, it was bound and framed by fault. The very idea of
private ordering in divorce had always drawn rebukes from judges, legislators,
and other voices of family-law authority.
The creation and rapid diffusion of no-fault divorce obviously sought to
reframe the debate about private ordering in fundamental ways. It represented a
deliberate attempt to break free of the past and, in my language, to tilt the balance
in the law permanently in the direction of private ordering. The goal was to make
the law conform to what was considered the way marital dissolution actually
functioned. And thus it represented one of the most direct endorsements of
private ordering in family law, and its attendant redefinition of marital morality,
ever attempted in American family law. But, as we all know now, this vigorous
endorsement of family-law private ordering has had only limited success. Rapid
enactment of no-fault divorce has not permanently refrained the issue. Instead it
has provoked a renewed debate about the proper balance in divorce law between
public and private interests. A backlash against the innovation has spread, fed by
strong opposition to the very idea of no-fault. The renewed debate suggests once
more the hold of the past on the present and the difficulties of permanently
altering the balance of family-law rules. The past, it turns out, is not so easily left
behind.
Equally significant for my argument today, once again, is that a change in
family law's balance has had unintended consequences. One set of experiences
is particularly revealing and has been captured in a recent book by Austin Sarat
and William Felstiner.30 They observed the actual negotiations in law offices
between divorce lawyers and their clients in two states after the passage of nofault statutes. Sarat and Felstiner discovered that many clients resisted the
attempt to take fault completely out of the divorcing experience. Instead angry
and hurt spouses wanted to tell the lawyers their stories of victimization. They
wanted the lawyers to listen to their stories, join them in blaming their spouses,
and provide them with some measure of support, vindication, and legitimation.
The divorce lawyers, on the other hand, accepted the rules-of the new no-fault
regime and wanted the discussions to be rational, organized, and free of
acrimony associated with the discarded fault system. They dismissed their
clients' stories and claims of victimization as irrelevant and tried to get them to
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focus on the governing rules and processes. But the lawyers could not keep their
clients from telling stories and seeking their support.
The persistent efforts of clients to bring fault back into no-fault divorce
proceedings strikes me as quite significant. It documents some popular beliefs
about the proper level of private ordering in family law, and it raises interesting
questions about contemporary notions of rationality and the importance of
individual storytelling in family-law disputes. And it also underscores the role
of litigants in the creation and application of family law and in the maintenance
or alteration of its balance between private and public ordering. These are not
now, nor have they ever have been, debates that can be completely orchestrated
by legal professionals. The recently renewed debate over no-fault thus seems to
me to be yet another telling example of the continued power of the inherited way
we have framed family-law debates about private ordering to influence the
present.
I want to conclude this brief foray into family law's past debates about private
ordering by making it clear that by spilling a little blood my intent has not been
to argue that the past has such a stranglehold on the present that change is
impossible. Nor has it been to make facile one-to-one correlations between past
and present experiences. Instead, I have merely wanted to suggest that there is
much to be gained by engaging with the complications of the past and
remembering that the question facing this Roundtable is not new. On the
contrary, it is an old one in this republic and the historical record is strewn with
answers to it. I also think that it is important to understand that private ordering's
past not only continues to shape the present, but also resists any easy summation
as well as any attempts at uniformity across the categories of family law and
permanent policies, Thus to me the question posed issued to the participants in
this Roundtable-Do you think that private ordering should be the dominant new
force in American family law?--compels me to give two responses. First, private
ordering is an old, not a new, force in family law. Second, now as in the past, its
use and its consequences vary across the categories of family law and the
experiences of family members. Thus my answer to the question facing members
of this Roundtable is an unequivocal "maybe." After looking backwards, it seems
to me that the appeal of private ordering in family law depends on the families
and the family relations in question.
AKHIL REED AMAR

I was thinking about Jeff and Eric's paper, and let me identify four areas of law
that might usefully bear upon some of the questions at issue. One is contract law,
and an important distinction between one-shot contracts and relational contracts.
Jeff, in the two hypotheticals you gave-one set of problems in the paper with
Eric, and then the other with the probate code-there is a difference between
those. At first, these vacillating laws seem similar: there are two options, you
need a witness or you don't need a witness, or no-fault or fault divorce. Why not
let people opt at an earlier stage into one box or the other? I think one possible
difference might be that in probate, it is a little easier, perhaps, to foresee various
things than in a marriage that lasts many years. You do not even know the
configuration of family members, of kids, of employment. Connected to that, can
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you change your mind at some intermediate point between the initial decision and
the final point? That question of renegotiation, which is a big issue of contract
law, is a dilemma. Eric set out one horn of the dilemma, renegotiation that
basically undermines the initial deal and uses threat advantage; and Jeff, you set
out the other prong of the dilemma: if you do not allow renegotiation, you trap
people into this world that they never quite envisioned, and you force them to
live in it. And that is a problem as well. That is probably less of a problem in the
probate hypothetical.
The second area of law is corporate law-consider corporations as a nexus of
contracts, and maybe the government providing various off-the-shelf models
from the limited corporation and the public corporation, and you can opt into
that, and you can tailor it and adjust it. But again the big issue of corporate law
is the renegotiation question, especially when renegotiation has effects on third
parties who are not quite voters, and when a majority of the stockholders try to
amend the charter of the corporation, but a minority really disagrees. Is this kind
of an extortionistic taking advantage of opportunities that really breaches the
underlying initial contract when you have a company taking over another? Are
all the gains of that takeover really breaking implicit contracts with employees
and all the rest?
The third area of law is partnership law. The problem with no-fault as I see it
is that basically men typically are allowed to breach the implicit agreement that
they made to take care of their partners and their children for the rest of their
lives, and maybe that is because the equality idea of a 50-50 distribution makes
a certain amount of sense, but we have just misconceptualized what it is to be
divided. Just the pot of assets that actually exists at the time of dissolution? That
is a pretty narrow conception of what it is to be divided, when the real assets are
his law degree and partnership at Cravath, which will generate over the next
thirty years quite a lot. If we think about a balanced federal budget, we have an
anemic conception of a balanced budget if we focus on every year actually
having to have a cash-flow balance, as opposed to a capital budget versus a
current-expenditure budget, and partnership law may have more expansive
resources for us to think about. Opportunities can be created during the course
of a partnership that are only cashed in later on. Perhaps we might also have a
trust model. I do not know enough about trust law to know whether that might
also be a useful possible analogy when we think about the money issue, which
is different from whom do you have to live with, and can you remarry.
And finally, the constitutional-law argument that I have been trying to
highlight is a set of Thirteenth Amendment considerations, that is when you try
to specifically enforce personal-service contracts, and when you are actually
dealing with persons' bodies, and not just talking about money. And then
questions about voluntariness emerge: at what point in time, and are you talking
about persons' bodies, their reproductive services, who they can live with, who
they spend time day-to-day with, and so on.
And I would say the law generally does really sharply distinguish between
promises to pay over property and promises to actually perform with one's own
body, personal service, and this is connected even to ideas of bankruptcy and
fresh start, and certain things that are inalienable. We do not let one sell oneself
in a future state into certain forms of limits on bodily liberty, and this was a shift
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from the founding vision that said if you sign up at time T, for servitude, that is
voluntary, not involuntary, because you signed up for it, and as long as you did
not agree to more than seven years, that was not unconscionable or a violation
of public policy. Contrast that founding version with the Civil War understanding
of involuntary servitude, when we looked at voluntariness at the time that
Rumpelstiltskin comes and demands the child, at the time that performance is
due, handing over another person. And the law does, I think, on Thirteenth
Amendment grounds sharply distinguish between personal-service contracts,
where you cannot contract for specific performance, and other things. Within
marriage, I guess I would say if you have a preference for private ordering, the
parties can work out whatever they want, and as long as they have their own
arrangement, the law does not intervene, and they can have a church arrangement
in which they do things, they can have private mediation. If certain people
consent to certain kinds of touching, we might permit that. There might be certain
things that no one can consent to, certain kinds of beatings, but there may be
intermediate kinds of physical contact where consent matters, and I would think
that judges and the state should not intervene in the interior of the marriage
relationship, but should instead specify what are the conditions upon which exit
is possible. And once we have that exit option, we should not have ongoing
judicial supervision of the child custody and all the rest because that really does
interfere with basically people's ability to structure their families. We should
identify selective nodes of public intervention. Ordinary people decide whom
they are going to get to marry, and then they can, and the state allows this
marriage, and then the state says, "Here are the exit possibilities," and there may
be some ability to contract about that within a limit, but in the interior of
marriage, I guess I am a little nervous about judges getting involved.
MICHAEL GROSSBERG:

Martha, would you like to address this issue?
MARTHA FINEMAN:

It seems to me that as long as you have an institution like marriage, it is going
to obscure things. Marriage does a lot of work in this society, and it does not
make a lot of sense to talk about whether you can make a valid contract that
includes either a $100 penalty or a beating as the remedy for failure to put dinner
on the table at the right time. Because, in fact, what happens is that some people
in this relationship have more access to "self-help." So what might happen in a
large number of cases would be that the wife gets both the beating and assessed
the $100 in compensation for her failure to have dinner on the table at the right
time.
Our history with and understanding of the institution of marriage serve to
influence our interpretations of the transactions that occur. Some actions get set
aside and labeled "domestic"-responses that reflect the fact that they occur
within the confines of private family interactions. Because a beating is a more
"private" response, it is understood as a more predictable, even appropriate,
response than an impersonal, court-enforced $100 penalty. That is why I think
we have to take away the whole protective shield of marriage and make all
relationships subject to the same sets of default rules. So, the question would be
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not whether a specific contract is valid within marriage. The question rather is,
Is an explicit contract where a married woman agrees to a beating going to be
enforced by a court? As it is now, beatings are permitted by the system,
condoned by prosecutors, judges, and juries that refuse to convict for domestic
violence-even before this, and by police who do not respond to calls of
domestic violence. The question is why these responses are only validated
within the context of marriage.
Q: Should they be?
MARTHA FINEMAN:

No! In my opinion, people should not be able to contract to be beaten for
failure to serve dinner on time. It would be the same result if I beat you because
you agreed to sit in another part of this auditorium. If I do resort to violence, you
should have some sort of remedy against me for my doing so-both tort and
criminal remedies. And the system should provide the same remedies for an
irrational response to a failure to have dinner on the table at a specific time.
Q: And Martha, you believe that even if there were an antecedent contract that
supposedly you signed, you know, see, because Eric says, "Oh but you signed the
contract," you and I are saying "But there are certain things you cannot be, you
could not even sign ...
MARTHA FINEMAN:

I see that marriage is treated differently and transactions within marriage are
treated differently. Our assumptions about the institution of marriage relieve us
from consideration of larger principles. This is why we have to get rid of
marriage as a legal institution. If the question is whether we should allow people
to contract to do certain violent things to each other then let's answer this for all
people-just do not limit the ability to legalize abuse to certain categories of
people. Marriage should not serve the purpose of exposing women to private
abuses of power. It has had that role historically, of course.
Q: One question for Akhil, just on the Thirteenth Amendment, and the point of
specific performance of contracts, of services, of personal-services contracts or
others. You carefully distinguished those personal-services contracts from
questions relating directly to money-will this money go that way, or will these
assets, land go this way or that way-but there is something in between that at
least I did not clearly hear you answer, and that is the personal-services contract,
but where the only enforcement is by the damages remedy, as opposed to the
specific-performance remedy.
AKHIL REED AMAR:

That ordinarily does not involve the Thirteenth Amendment. If I do not do this,
I pay. There is a wonderful article by my friend Lea Vander Velde in the Yale
Law Journal a few years ago in which she makes an observation about the
genesis of the rule about personal-service contracts. Actually here is the rule that
ultimately emerged: we will not force you to play for the Yankees, if you do not
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want to, but you cannot play for anyone else. And this actually was a different
rule than what many judges thought immediately after the Civil War, which is,
you have to be able to get out of your contract, and you can play for another
team, but you might have to pay damages. We could even talk about the
permissibility of contracting for liquidated damages, but you got to play where
you wanted. Our rule today is the rule of Lumley v. Wagner. Lea Vander Velde
shows that it has very gendered origins. Actually, this initially arose not in the
context of baseball players, but women opera singers and actresses. And in fact
the image was of the fickle woman, the inconstant woman who is Madonna (the
singer), Marilyn Monroe, Elizabeth Taylor. There are not male counterparts to
this. The woman who flits from man to man-as I said, it is a very gendered
image-and these were women who made agreements with their managers and
then, in their fickle way, walked off and Went into the arms of some other
manager, and the rule that judges basically came down with was: We are not
going to force you to work with this man but you cannot work for anyone else.
Now what Lea shows is these are judges who, the very same day they are doing
this, are issuing divorce decrees in favor of women of the following sort: We will
let you escape this connection with this man, but we will not let you marry any
other man. And it is fascinating, as I said, the very same day that they are
deciding some of these personal-service cases they are deciding divorce cases,
and with a similar kind of mentality.
And so even when you are talking about bodily service, we could talk about
both the negative and affirmative variety, what we will affirmatively compel you
to do, and what we will actually enjoin you from doing with your body, and all
of that is different simply from having to pay money because these injunctions
are specifically enforceable if permitted.
Q (to Professor Grossberg): Today are we experiencing a debate over private
ordering in family law just like the ones of the past?
MICHAEL GROSSBERG:

Well, I think that the issue of private ordering in family law is being discussed
now because we are once again in an era of severe conflict over families.
Concerns about the state of American families emerged in the 1970s and took
expression as they had before in calls for limits on family diversity-restraints
on what I have called functional families. These calls were championed by
organized groups of family savers like the Moral Majority, and they tried to tilt
the balance in family law away from private ordering through state-imposed
restrictions on abortion, divorce, and child rearing. As in the past, demands for
greater uniformity in American family life arose for multiple reasons. Prominent
among these was a fear about the well-being of American families fed by
developments such as rising levels ofjuvenile delinquency, growing numbers of
single-parent households, and escalating divorce rates. Critics considered these
social problems and contended that they stemmed from the tolerance for family
diversity that had characterized the previous era. We are now dealing with the
results of the conflicts spawned by those movements. As has occurred many
times in the past, we are grappling with basic questions about the balance
between private and public interests in family law. However, I do not mean to
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argue that we are simply experiencing the past repeating itself. Though, as I have
tried to explain, the past influences the present, it is not the only source of
contemporary conflict and contention. In our time, it seems to me that the debate
about private ordering in family law is framed not only by past experiences but
also by the privileged place that has been given to economic notions of private
ordering. Assumptions of rationality and scientism that seem to me to be
embedded in contemporary notions of private ordering in the market have spilled
over into our debates about family life. These market-based ideals are considered
by many people to be the appropriate models for analyzing family problems and
the appropriate sources of remedies for those problems. Private ordering thus has
a market meaning that is different in many ways from its past. The result is a
debate that is different in many ways from those in the past about private
ordering in family law. In short, as at any moment in time, our debates combine
both continuity and change. To understand the debates of our time we need to
sort out both.

